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LESSEE'S RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN EMINENT DOMAIN
I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]he statutes of this state relating to eminent domain proceedings
have been enacted, modified, revised, repealed and re-enacted in so many
particulars as to leave the law in a state of uncertainty and confusion."'
It is the purpose of this comment to examine one specific area of the
procedural law of eminent domain: the right of a lessee of condemned
property to have his damages determined by the jury.
The Florida Constitution does not provide a clear procedural guide
for the role of the jury in eminent domain proceedings. The constitutional
directive that private property shall not be taken without due 'process of
law,2 nor taken from the owner without compensation determined by a
jury of twelve men,- is subject to a wide range of interpretation. That
the Florida cases have run the full scale has been due largely to the
modification and revision of the eminent domain statutes.
II. FLORIDA STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Sections 73.114 and 73.12; of the Florida Statutes contain the form
of verdict and form of judgment in eminent domain proceedings. The
provisions of these two statutes regulate the procedural rights of the parties
to a condemnation suit.
A. Pre-1959 Provisions
Prior to the 1959 amendment of section 73.12 of the statutes there
was no definite statutory provision dealing with the right of a lessee of
condemned property to have a jury determine his damages. Section 73.126
provided that the jury would fix the compensation to be awarded to each
owner; and that the court would apportion the award among the owner
and any mortgagees, judgment creditors and lien holders. The statute was
silent as to the right of a lessee to have a jury determination of his interest.
The Supreme Court of Florida in Natural Gas & Appliance Co. v.
1. Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 110 So.2d 687,
692 (Fla. App. 1959).
2. FLA. COrNST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12: "nor shall private property be taken
without just compensation."
3. FLA. CONST. art XVI, § 29: "No private property, nor right of way shall be
appropriated to the use of any corporation or individual until full compensation therefor
shall be first made to the owner, or first secured to him by deposit of money which
compensation, irrespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such
corporation or individual, shall be ascertained by a jury of twelve men in a court of
competent jurisdiction, as shall be prescribed by law."
4. FLA. STAT. § 73.11 (1959).
5. FLA. STAT. § 73.12 (1959).
6. FLA. STAT. § 73.12 (1951): "The court upon appropriate petition shall de-
termine the rights of any mortgages [sic], judgment creditors and lienholders in respect
to the compensation awarded to each owner by the verdict."
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Marion County,7 a 1952 case, approved a jury verdict fixing the amount
of a lessee's damages in a condemnation suit. The question before the
court was the adequacy of the verdict. In affirming the jury's award the
court stated:
The question of special damages to the remainder of the
property occupied by the appellant, as lessee, was fairly submitted
to the jury under appropriate instructions from the Court. They
rendered a verdict in which they fixed the amount of damages
to the appellant for the land taken and special damages to the
remainder.8
The opinion of the court did not reveal if the procedure of allowing
the jury to determine the amount of the lessee's damages was challenged
by the condemning authority. Nevertheless, the case by implication is
authority for the statement that the lessee of real property is entitled to
have a jury determine the amount of his damages as well as the damages
suffered by the fee owner. The 1951 version of section 73.12 of the statutes9
provided that each owner was entitled to have the jury determine his
damages in eminent domain proceedings, and apparently the court con-
sidered a lessee to be an "owner" within the meaning of the statute. This
case is the sole Florida Supreme Court decision. dealing with the right -of
a lessee to have the jury fix his damages.
In Shavers v. Duval County,10 decided two years after the Natural
Gas case, the Florida Supreme Court held that a mortgagee was not an
"owner" within the meaning of section 73.12 and thus was not entitled
to recover attorney's fees in a condemnation suit. The court stated: that
the condemnation statutes are to be construed strictly; that under Florida
law, a mortgagee is the owner of a chose in action which creates a lien
upon the land, not the owner of an estate or proprietary interest."
The right to have a jury determination of damages' in eminent domain
proceedings is further limited by the often expressed doctrine that an
eminent domain action is rot the proper proceeding to determine questions
of title to the condemned property. 12 The sole function of the jury is to
determine the value of the property being taken. The contest as to the
recipient of the award should be determined in a supplemental hearing.
Porter v. Columbia County13 is illustrative. One J. H. Porter claimed to
. . .58. So.2d..701.. (Fla. 1952),........ .......................
8. Id. at 702.
9. See note 6 supra.
10. 73 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1954).
11. Id. at 687; see Waldock v. Iba, 114 Fla. 786, 150 So. 231, rehearing. granted
at 803 (1933), aff'd on rehearing, 153 So. 915 (1934); Evins v. Gainesville Nat'l Bank,
80 Fla. 84, 85 So. 659 (1920).
12. Cravero v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 91 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1956);
Porter v. Columbia County, 75 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1954); Shavers v. Duval County, 73
So.2d 684 (Fla. 1954).
13. 75 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1954).
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be the fee simple owner of property condemned by the defendant, which
had named Mary Porter as the sole owner. J. H. Porter requested that he
be allowed to testify that he was the owner, and evidence was offered as
to his interest in the property. An objection to this testimony was sustained
and the ruling affirmed on appeal, the Florida Supreme Court stating:
It is not the purpose of an eminent domain proceeding to try
title to the property .... The purpose of the eminent domain pro-
ceeding is to determine the value of the property taken and
damage to the remainder, irrespective of ownership. Such questions
as interest in the property, ownership, liens on property, may be
determined in the same action in a summary proceeding after the
jury has ascertained and rendered a verdict as to the value of the
property taken and damage to the remainder. 14
As a general rule, the value of property taken, under the eminent
domain power is the fair market value of the property at the time of the
taking. 1 If the fair market value is the basis for the award, the question
of ownership is immaterial in awarding damages. In this regard, it is not
necessary for the jury to determine who is the fee simple owner as that
issue has no effect on the jury's determination of the damages to be
awarded.
B. The 1959 Amendment of Section 73.12
In 1959 the Florida Legislature amended section 73.12 to provide that:
The court upon appropriate petition shall deteimin.e the rights
of any owners, lessees, mortgagees, judgment creditors and lien
holders in respect to the compensation awarded to each owner by
the verdict, and the method of apportionment among interested
parties together with the disposition of any other matters arising
from the taking."'
As a result of this amendment, the Florida district court of appeal
held that a lessee of condemned property has no right to a jury determina-
tion of his damages." As of the present time, the Florida Supreme Court
has not passed on the question.
The leading decision on the construction of section 73.12 is Rich v.
Harper Neon Co. 8 At the trial, the fee owner moved that the claim of
the lessee be deferred until the jury had determined the damage due the
14. Id. at 700.
15. Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 110 So.2d 687,
689 (Fla. App. 1959); JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN, VALUATION AND PROCEDURE § 130
(1953).
16. FLA. STAT. § 73.12 (1959).
17. Parker v. Armstrong, 125 So.2d 138 (Fla. App. 1960); Rich v. Harper Neon
Co., 124 So.2d 750 (Fla. App. 1960); Wingert v. Prince, 123 So.2d 277 (Fla. App.
1960).
18. Supra note 17.
[VOL. XXII
COMMENTS
owner. The trial court, denying the motion, held that the question of
damages due the fee owner and the lessee should be submitted to the jury.
The fee owner appealed from the denial of the motion. The order of the
trial court was reversed on appeal. The appellate court held that under
section 73.12 the lessee was not entitled to a jury determination of his
damages. The court stated that the jury was to find a total award which
the trial judge would apportion between the interested parties. The holding
was based on the express terms of section 73.12 and on the Porter9 and
Cravero20 cases, decided by the Florida Supreme Court, which had held
that an eminent domain action is not a proper action in which to try
questions of title.
The opinion in Rich v. Harper Neon Co. is more notable for its
holding than for any discussion of the issues involved. The court made
no attempt to analyze the cases relied on as authority. It is submitted
that the case authority cited by the court is not relevant to the issue.
The Porter and Cravero cases held only that an eminent domain proceed-
ing is not the proper action to try questions of title. In the Rich case
no conflict of title question was presented. The parties by admission stood
-in the relationship of landlord and tenant. The jury was not to determine
if the lessee had a valid lease, but rather the damages to be awarded the
lessee. The statement that the jury will not determine questions of title
does not appear to be authority for the holding that the jury will not
fix damages to be awarded a lessee. In the Rich case, the court also stated
that "a circuit judge can more properly apportion the interest of various
claimants to a certain tract of land than could a jury, under the circum-
stances. 21 This reasoning could support the total elimination of trial by
jury. A judge, by way of his training, is better suited to determine any
question, either law or fact, which is at issue in any case. The judge is
better qualified to fix the total amount of the award, as well as to ap-
portion the jury award among the interested parties. The presence of the
jury in an eminent domain proceeding is not required because a jury
possesses mystical qualifications not present in the judges of the State of
Florida, but because the Constitution of the State of Florida grants a jury
trial as a matter of right.
22
It is this writer's view that the only valid ground for the holding in
the Rich case is the express language of section 73.12 of the statute. There
was no discussion in the opinion as to any conflict between section 73.12
and the Florida Constitution.
19. Porter v. Columbia County, 75 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1954); see text at note 13
supra.
.20. Cravero v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 91 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1956).
21. Rich v. Harper Neon Co., 124 So.2d 750, 752 (Fla. App. 1960).
22. FLA. CONSI. art. XVI, § 29.
1961]
106 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 73.12
The apportionment procedure provided for in section 73.1228 has
not been challenged in the Florida Supreme Court. The cases construing
the statute have not discussed any constitutional issue. It is therefore
emphasized that the subsequent discussion represents only the speculation
of this author.
The Florida Constitution grants to each owner the right to have his
damages in an eminent domain proceeding determined by a jury of twelve
men.24 The validity of the apportionment procedure of section 73.12 would
appear to present a question of constitutional interpretation.
A. Sister State Decisions
As is to be expected, a conflict of authority exists as to the procedural
method to be followed in the apportionment of damages among the in-
terested parties in condemnation suits. Any attempt to state general
rules must fail due to the diversity of constitutional and statutory provisions
among the states.
The great weight of authority holds that the jury determines the
total value of the condemned land, irrespective of the several interests in
the land.2r The compensation is for the taking of the land, not the several
interests in the land:
The value of property cannot be enhanced by any distribution
of the title or estate. . . .Whatever advantage is secured to one
interest must be taken from another, and the sum of all the parts
cannot exceed the wholeY0
The Florida rule is in accord with the majority position. Section 73.12
of, the Florida Statutes27 provides that compensation shall be determined
as a whole, irrespective of the various interests in the land, and the case
authority supports the validity of this procedure.
28
B. Apportionment by Judge or Jury
A sharp conflict of authority exists on the question of how the jury
award for the entire value of the condemned property shall be apportioned
among the several interests in the land. Notwithstanding the variance of
state constitutional and statutory provisions, -there is an interpretative
23. See text at note 16 supra.
24. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 29.
25. 4 NICHOLS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 12-36 (1951).
26. LEwis EMINENT DOMAIN § 483, at 634 (1888).
27. FLA. STAT. § 73.12 (1959).
28. Cravero v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 91 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1956);
Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 110 So.2d 687 (Fla. App.
1959); Dratch v. Dade County, 105 So.2d 171 (Fla. App. 1958).
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conflict among the states as to the right of a lessee to have a jury
determination of his damages.
Two cases have been selected for discussion as illustrative of the
prevalent positions: one holds that an owner is not entitled to have a jury
determine his award; another holds that a lessee is entitled to a jury
determination of his damages.
In State, By and Through State Highway Comm'n v. Burke,29 the
Oregon Supreme Court rejected an owner's argument that he was entitled
to have the jury determine the extent of his interest in a condemnation
award.30 The court held that a condemnation proceeding is an action in
rem, not the taking of a personal right, but a taking of the property.
As such, individual owners have no constitutional right to a separate
valuation of their interests in the land, even though they may answer and
allege the value of the property and damage resulting from the condemna-
tion. After a determination of a lump sum award by the jury, the fund
is paid into court by the condemning authority and:
•[A]fter the state has paid into court the sum awarded by the
jury, the condemnation proceedings, as such, are at an end, and
judgment vesting title in the state follows. But this leaves in the
court a fund in which the former lessor and lessees have interests
which are the equivalent in money of the interests formerly held
in the land .. . .[T]he determination of the relative interests in
the fund may involve the most intricate and difficult problems, for
the determination of which, juries are unsuited. The interposition
*of equity is required.3 1
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in City of Ashland v. Price,82
came to a conclusion directly opposite to that of the Oregon court. The
Kentucky court rejected the theory that the eminent domain action is
one in rem, in which the personal rights of the landowners may be dis-
regarded for the exercise of judicial "expertise" in apportioning a jury
award. The court said:
There is much authority for having the separate interests-of a
lessor and lessee disregarded in the trial of the condemnation. pro-
ceeding. This is based on the conception that it is an action in
rem and does not deal with persons. . . .But the interests of a
lessor and lessee are obviously different in character. . . .Section
29. 200 Ore. 211, 265 P.2d 783 (1954).
30. ORE. CONST. art. I, § 18: "Private property shall not be taken for public
use, nor the particular services of any man be demanded, without just compensation;
nor except in the case of the state, without such compensation first assessed and
tendered ...."
31. State, By and Through State Highway Comm'n v. Burke, 200 Ore. 211, 258,
265 P.2d 783, 804 (1954): See also New Jersey Highway AuthrityW . & F. Holding
Co., 40 N.J. Super. 309, 123 A.2d 25 (App. Div. 1956).
32. 318 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1958). See also Lambert v. Griffin, 257-111. 152, 100
N .E . 4 9 6 (19 12 ).. . .. .- :
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13, a part of our Bill of Rights, declares that no "man's property
[shall] be taken or applied to public use without the consent of
his representatives, and without just compensation being previous-
ly made to him." This deals with persons. ... Thus our Constitu-
tion looks to compensation of persons. . . . Our Constitution,
Section 242, plainly says that the damage for the property taken
for public use shall be assessed by a jury . . . . Therefore, it would
not be proper or right for the court independently of a jury to
divide a single award where multiple claims rest upon different
estates. We conclude therefore, that the compensation of the
lessor and lessee, respectively, must be fixed by a jury.
3 3
IV. CONCLUSION
The rationale of the Kentucky Court of Appeals appears to be more
applicable to the construction of the Florida statute than does that of
the Oregon court. There does not seem to be any indication in any Florida
case that Florida regards an eminent domain action as a proceeding in
rem. In Shavers v. Duval County;4 the Florida Supreme Court, in
construing the word "owner" as used in section 73.12, held that it did
not include a mortgagee, who had only a lien on the land. Certainly a
lessee, who has an estate for years, is an "owner" within this reasoning
and should be granted the right to a jury determination of his damages.
The Florida Constitution does not provide for an in rem action in
eminent domain proceedings. It grants to the owner of real property the
right to a jury determination of damages, all questions of judicial expertise
notwithstanding. The constitution grants to the individual owner the right
that compensation determined by a jury shall be paid or secured to him
before the property may be taken. Thus, the Florida Constitution provides
for the compensation of persons as does the Kentucky Constitution.
It is submitted that the statutory apportionment procedure provided
in section 73.12 of the Florida Statutes is violative of article XVI, section
29 of the Florida Constitution." Regardless of the final determination of
the constitutional question, the issue is one which should be discussed
when the statute is construed. If the Florida appellate courts are to hold
the statute constitutional, they should not do so by implication.
RICHARD E. RECKSON
33. City of Ashland v. Price, supra note 32, at 864.
34. 73 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1954).
35. See note 3 supra.
[VOL. XVI
